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INTRODUCTION: BARNETTE AT 75
Howard M. Wasserman*
If one wished to celebrate the First Amendment in a symposium, 201819 offered milestone anniversaries of numerous constitutional landmarks.
Consider 2019. It is the centennial of Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v.
United States,1 2300 words that invented the freedom of speech under the
First Amendment.2 It is the 50th anniversary of Brandenburg v. Ohio,3 the
modern and substantially more speech-protective restatement of Holmes’
clear-and-present concept, and of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,4 the high-water mark for student speech in a time
in which students in school receive the least speech protection.5 It is the 30th
anniversary of Texas v. Johnson,6 which recognized First Amendment
protection for burning the American flag, and the controversy that followed
it.7 Meanwhile, 2018 marked the 45th anniversary of the modern and stillcontrolling definition of unprotected obscenity,8 in a time when sexual
expression thrives on the internet. It also marked the 220th anniversary of the
Alien and Sedition Acts.
But a better option presented itself in 2018—the 75th anniversary of
1943’s West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, in which the
Supreme Court overruled a three-year-old decision to hold that public-school
students could not be compelled to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of

*

Professor of Law, Florida International University (FIU) College of Law. A version of these remarks was
delivered at the Winter Meeting of the First Amendment Lawyer’s Association in February 2019. It was
my privilege to organize this symposium; I thank the participants and the editors and staff of FIU Law
Review for creating a marvelous program.
1

250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

2

THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—

AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 7(2013); Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and

Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 (2016).
3

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).

4

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

5

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 851.

6

491 U.S. 397 (1989).

7

ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, FLAG BURNING AND FREE SPEECH: THE CASE OF TEXAS V. JOHNSON

(2000).
8 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 847.
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Allegiance.9 Barnette is one of Justice Robert Jackson’s most famous and
significant opinions. The case sits at the intersection of the First
Amendment’s speech and religion clauses, as the plaintiffs were Jehovah’s
Witnesses with a religious objection to the compelled pledge. The case arose
in the midst of the patriotic fervor of World War II, brought by members of
an historically oppressed religious minority.10
The program, held at FIU College of Law in October 2018,11 divided
perfectly. Panel I focused on Barnette’s historical context and the time period
in which the case arose.12 Panel II focused on Barnette as text and the best
way to read and interpret Jackson’s words.13 Panel III focused on Barnette’s
modern context, its continued relevance, and its prominent role in three
decisions from the Supreme Court’s October Term 2017.14 John Q. Barrett,
the leading scholar on Robert Jackson, delivered a keynote address exploring
Jackson’s life and how it lead him to Barnette.15
Barnette is known for several things. It established a First Amendment
liberty against compelled expression, protecting individuals against being
compelled to utter government-mandated, -approved, or -certified messages.
It introduced the First Amendment into the mix of patriotic speech, symbols,
and rituals—the American flag, other flags, the Pledge, and the national
anthem. It is a wonderful piece of prose, one of the Court’s great pieces of
First Amendment writing (along with Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California,16 which one scholar labeled the “most important
essay ever written” on the meaning of the First Amendment).17 And it was
9 319 U.S. 624, 625–26 (1943); Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 99, 99–100 (Richard W. Garnett and
Andrew Koppelman, eds., 2012).
10

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 652; Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 109–12.

11

The program is available for viewing at: Barnette at 75: The Past, Present, and Future of the
“Fixed Star in Our Constitutional Constellation”, FIU L. REV. SYMPOSIA [hereinafter Barnette at 75],
https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreviewsymposia/Barnette/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
12 Ronald K.L. Collins, Thoughts on Hayden C. Covington and the Paucity of Litigation
Scholarship, 13 FIU L. REV. 599 (2019); Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star After All: West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning of the First Amendment Right Not to
Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741 (2019); Post-Panel Commentary, 13 FIU L. REV. 827, 827–35 (2019).
13 Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, in Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU L. REV. 689
(2019); Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L. REV. 765 (2019); Steven D. Smith; “Fixed
Star” or Twin Star? the Ambiguity of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 801 (2019); Post-Panel Commentary,
supra note 12, at 835–40.
14 Leslie Kendrick, A Fixed Star in Shifting Skies: Barnette and Civil Rights Law, 13 FIU L. REV.
729 (2019); Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639 (2019);
Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667
(2019); Post-Panel Commentary, supra note 12, at 840–47.
15

John Q. Barrett, Justice Jackson in the Jehova’s Witnesses’ Cases, 13 FIU L. REV. 827 (2019).

16

274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

17

Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
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one of the first cases in which the Court upheld the First Amendment claim
of right, moving lyrical defenses of the freedom of speech into the majority
and out of dissents and concurrences.
The timing of this anniversary celebration of Barnette was fortuitous
because Barnette is back. Its principles are again in the courts and in the fore
of political, public, and judicial debates. Its principles are increasingly
contested, disputed, and litigated. And its principles are wielded towards
different political, ideological, and historical valances.
This symposium captured each of these, as do the articles that follow in
this issue of FIU Law Review.
I.

THE ROAD TO BARNETTE

In 1940, the Supreme Court in Minersville School District Board of
Education v. Gobitis18 rejected a First Amendment claim by Jehovah’s
Witness students expelled from a Pennsylvania public school for refusing to
salute the flag. Justice Frankfurter wrote for an eight-Justice majority that
included Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, all widely known as civil
libertarians. Only Justice Stone dissented.
As Vincent Blasi and Seanna Shiffrin describe, Gobitis triggered a wave
of violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses. The American Civil Liberties
Union reported to DOJ of attacks on more than 1500 Jehovah’s Witnesses in
335 incidents in 44 states in 1940. Many attacks were abetted, if not ignored,
by law enforcement. Some attackers pointed to Gobitis as a statement from
the Court that the Witnesses were traitors who could and should be compelled
by these mobs to salute the flag. More than 2000 Jehovah’s Witness students
were expelled across 48 states.19 And the Court did not limit its role to Gobitis
and children. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 1941, it affirmed the
conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for calling a police officer a fascist and
racketeer, establishing the “fighting words” exception to the First
Amendment.20
Three years after Gobitis, however, the issue of compulsory flag salutes
and Jehovah’s Witnesses returned to the Court, in a case involving three
Witness families from West Virginia (which had amended its law to compel
the Pledge following Gobitis).21 Several things had changed in the

Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988).
18

310 U.S. 586 (1940).

19

Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 109–12.

20

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573 (1941); Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 9,

at 110.
21

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
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intervening years. Jackson and Wiley Rutledge had replaced Chief Justice
Hughes and Justice McReynolds on the Court. Stone, the lone and forceful
dissenter in Gobitis, had been elevated to Chief Justice. Black, Douglas, and
Murphy had announced in a separate dissent that they had been wrong in
Gobitis. The historical context also had changed. In 1940, Europe was at war
but the United States was not; it skirted the edges of the conflict in the face
of a strong “America First” movement, reluctance to join another foreign
war, and fear of Nazi spies drawing the U.S. into the conflict. By 1943, the
United States was in the war, the tide was turning in the Allies’ favor, and
fears of a Nazi Third Column had subsided.22
Gobitis’ 8-1 majority rejecting the First Amendment claim became a 63 majority accepting the claim and protecting the right of the plaintiffs to optout of the pledge. Jackson wrote for the Court; Black concurred, joined by
Douglas, to explain the change of heart;23 Murphy did the same.24 Roberts
and Reed announced simply that they adhered to the views expressed in
Gobitis.25 Only Frankfurter wrote a full dissent.26
Jackson emphasized two points. The salute and participation in the flag
ritual represent a form of utterance, one requiring affirmation of belief and
state of mind.27 And the freedom to opt-out that the students asserted did not
collide with the rights of others; the opting-out Witnesses did not prevent
anyone who wanted to salute the flag or recite the pledge from doing so. The
only collision was between the right of the individual and the authority of
government to compel compliance for its own sake.28
Jackson’s opinion is known for several rhetorical flourishes in defense
of the First Amendment and its freedoms. Five are worth noting:
National unity as an end which officials may foster by
persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is
whether under our Constitution compulsion as here
employed is a permissible means for its achievement.29
That is, government can take steps to create a nation and to build unity
through its rhetoric; it may not do so by compelling adherence to those views.

22

Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 112.

23

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).

24

Id. at 644 (Murphy, J., concurring).

25

Id. at 642–43 (Robert and Reed, JJ., stating the opinion that the judgment below should be

reversed).
26

Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

27

Id. at 632.

28

Id. at 630–31.

29

Id. at 640.

2019]

Introduction

589

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts.30
This responded to Frankfurter’s dissent here and his majority opinion in
Gobitis, both of which urged judicial deference to the decisions and policies
of majoritarian branches of government.31
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a
compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds.32
A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and
what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest
and scorn.33
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.34
The final statement is the opinion’s most famous (and gives the symposium
its title). It also is only partially true. Government and government officials
can prescribe orthodoxy in politics, nationalism, and other matters. But
government may not do so by compelling citizens to utter or represent
agreement with that orthodoxy.
II. BARNETTE AND THE FLAG
Barnette has been a key precedent in other constitutional disputes over
the flag. The Court cited and quoted it in cases arising from convictions for
burning or otherwise defacing an American flag. In establishing First
Amendment protection for flag desecration in Texas v. Johnson, Justice
Brennan emphasized the expressive nature of the flag and the act of
30

Id. at 638.

31

Id. at 646, 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 598 (1940).
32

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.

33

Id. at 632–33.

34

Id. at 642.
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utterances associated with it; he quoted in full Jackson’s language about
national unity as an end fostered by persuasion rather than compulsion and
the homage to the “fixed star in our constitutional constellation.”35 The Court
did the same in Spence v. Washington in reversing a conviction under a state
state statute prohibiting the placement of figures or images on an American
flag.36
Controversies over the flag, pledge, anthem, and related patriotic
symbolism arise periodically. Even with Barnette, a story often surfaces in
which a public-school student is sanctioned or singled out for exercising his
rights under Barnette to opt-out of the pledge.
In 2009, a lawsuit was filed against the New York Yankees by two fans
who were evicted from Yankee Stadium when they attempted to leave their
seats during the playing of “God Bless America” during the Seventh-Inning
Stretch, in violation of a team policy established after 9/11. The lawsuit
settled, with the Yankees agreeing not to prohibit fans from moving during
the song.37
In 2010, Mississippi Judge Talmadge Littlejohn held in contempt of
court an attorney who failed to recite the pledge at the beginning of court
proceedings, as was the judge’s courtroom practice; Littlejohn jailed the
attorney for five hours until rescinding the contempt citation. The Mississippi
Commission on Judicial Performance recommended that Littlejohn be
reprimanded and assessed $ 100 in costs, a sanction the Supreme Court of
Mississippi affirmed.38
The most recent controversy, ongoing since 2015, involves Colin
Kaepernick and several NFL players kneeling during the pre-game playing
of the national anthem. The issue took on national consequence in fall 2017,
when President Trump turned it into a political football, repeatedly calling
on the NFL to cut or suspend players who did not stand at attention for the
anthem on the field.39 Vice President Pence flew to a game in Indiana

35

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 401, 415 (1989).

36

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam).

37

Complaint, Campeau-Laurion v. Kelly, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009) (No. 09-CV-3790); Yankees
Settle ‘God Bless America’ Case, Won’t Restrict Spectators’ Movements During Song, NYCLU (July 7,
2009),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/yankees-settle-god-bless-america-case-wont-restrictspectators-movements-during-song.
38 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d 968, 973 (Miss. 2011); MISS.
COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 2010-216: COMMISSION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION (2010), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/lampley-judperf-order.pdf.
39 See Ryan Wilson, Donald Trump: NFL Should Have Suspended Colin Kaepernick for Kneeling,
CBS SPORTS (Oct. 12, 2017, 9:04 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/donald-trump-nfl-shouldhave-suspended-colin-kaepernick-for-kneeling/; USA Today Sports, Trump: NFL Should ‘Fire or
Suspend’ Players Who Kneel During Anthem, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2017, 8:30 AM),
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specifically to watch some players kneel and then to immediately leave the
stadium to protest their doing so.40 Justice Ginsburg got involved; asked
about the protests during a book event, she described the actions as “dumb”
and “disrespectful,” while conceding their right to protest “if they want to be
stupid.”41 One fan unsuccessfully sued the New Orleans Saints, claiming
intentional infliction of emotional distress from kneeling players injecting
politics into his football.42 A bill in Indiana would have required the
Indianapolis Colts to refund ticket costs for any fan who complained about
protesting players prior to the end of the first quarter of the game.43
In spring 2018, the NFL unilaterally imposed a new policy requiring
players to stand on the field or remain in the locker room during the anthem,
before withdrawing that policy several days later in the face of public
complaints and the threat of a union grievance.44 Meanwhile, unable to find
a team to sign him, Kaepernick filed a collusion grievance, alleging that
owners had agreed not to sign him in retaliation for his protest. Evidence
emerged in that proceeding that owners were scared of crossing the President,
who had contacted several of them, urged them to stop the players from
protesting, and insisted that criticizing the “disrespectful” protesting players
was a “winning issue” for him. Kaepernick and the NFL settled for an
undisclosed amount in early 2019.45
The NFL and other controversies expose two things. One is the flag’s
shifting messages. The flag, pledge, and anthem are not about the United
States or its government or society. They have become about the military,
veterans, soldiers, and those fighting foreign wars, such that those who do
not stand and salute disrespect those veterans and soldiers. The other is an
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/09/24/trump-nfl-should-fire-suspend-players-whokneel-during-anthem/697680001/.
40 See Steve Gardner, Report: VP Mike Pence’s Walkout at Indianapolis Colts NFL Game Costly
to Taxpayers, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2018, 3:56 PM),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2018/10/07/mike-pence-walkout-indianapolis-colts-gamecost-taxpayers/1559583002/.
41 Ariane de Vogue, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Kaepernick Protests: ‘I Think It’s Dumb and
Disrespectful’, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 12, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/10/politics/ruthbader-ginsburg-colin-kaepernick/index.html.
42 See Dragna v. New Orleans Saints, L.L.C., No. 18-C-514, 2018 WL 4997670 (La. App. 5 Cir.
10/15/18).
43 Khadrice Rollins, Indiana Bill Would Make Colts Give Refunds to Fans Bothered By Players
Kneeling
During
Anthem,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Dec.
29,
2017),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/12/29/colts-fans-bothered-players-kneeling-during-national-anthem-mayreceive-refunds.
44 Austin Knoblauch, NFL Anthem Policy on Hold Under Standstill Agreement, NFL (July 19,
2018, 10:50 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000941064/article/nfl-anthem-policy-on-holdunder-standstill-agreement.
45 Jamele Hill, Kaepernick Won. The NFL Lost., ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/colin-kaepernick-won-his-settlement-nfl/582994/.
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abandonment of Barnette’s insistence that patriotism will thrive if voluntary.
Trump and other critics assume what Jackson rejected—they accept the
“unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds” and act
as if national symbols are not so appealing that patriotic ceremonies can
remain voluntary and not compelled upon free minds.
Beyond Kaepernick’s grievance, the NFL protests and the league’s
efforts to stop them has not triggered litigation because neither the NFL nor
its teams are state actors. The assumption in conversations around
Kaepernick, however, is that players have a First Amendment liberty to optout and that the NFL violates the First Amendment but for the lack of state
action. I want to test that assumption with a hypothetical in which state action
is clearly present.46
Imagine that the head of a government agency (a county Recorder of
Deeds or the supervisor of a DMV office) announces that each workday
would begin ten minutes before doors open with employees standing together
at attention, reciting the pledge, and singing “America, the Beautiful.” The
supervisor explains that the ceremony, song, and recitation remind public
employees of their obligations to enforce and defend the Constitution and of
their obligations as public servants to provide for the needs of the people who
enter the office. Can an employee who wishes to opt-out be fired or otherwise
disciplined?
Two doctrinal points are clear. The Supreme Court has declared invalid
the use of loyalty oaths as a condition of public employment.47 And several
lower courts, in cases from the 1970s, held that public-school teachers cannot
be compelled to recite or lead the pledge, extending Barnette to employees.48
The latter became an issue during the 1988 presidential election, wielded by
Republican candidate George H.W. Bush against Democratic candidate
Michael Dukakis, who as Massachusetts governor had vetoed such a law, on
constitutional grounds.49
Two more-recent doctrinal shifts affect this answer in competing
directions. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that public employees have
no First Amendment rights when speaking is part of their job and their job
responsibilities. An employee does not speak as a citizen when he speaks as

46

I posed the hypothetical during the Panel III Q&A. See Post-Panel Commentary, supra note 12,

at 840.
47

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886

(1961).
48 See, e.g., Russo v. Cent. Sch. Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F.
Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970); State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534 (Ct. App. 1971).
49

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 88-89; Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 137.

2019]

Introduction

593

an employee performing his job functions and can be fired if the government
does not like what he says in performing those official functions.50
The open question is how Garcetti translates when the government
employer compels an employee to speak as part of her job as opposed to
prohibiting her from speaking as part of the job. The key is the existence of
a civilian or private analogue to the employee speech. If the compelled speech
is the same or analogous to speech the government might compel from a
member of the public, then the employee is not compelled to speak as part of
the job. If the compelled speech is unique and only could be engaged in by a
public employee in the course of performing her public duties, she is
compelled as part of the job and Garcetti defeats the First Amendment claim.
Two cases illustrate the issue.
In Jackler v. Byrne,51 a probationary police officer was fired for refusing
to file a false report and refusing to testify falsely as part of a departmental
investigation of officer misconduct. The Second Circuit held that Garcetti
did not control because giving testimony and evidence is something that
members of the public can and often do, not something unique to a public
employee. Government officials could attempt to compel a member of the
public to testify falsely in some proceeding, action that would violate the First
Amendment.52 In attempting to compel the police-officer plaintiff to do the
same, officials compelled him to speak as a citizen.
In contrast stands Miller v. Davis,53 an action arising from the refusal of
the clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell. Several
couples sued Davis for violating the Fourteenth Amendment; Davis defended
in part that issuing the license was expressive and that compelling her to do
so violated her freedom of speech.54 The district court rejected the defense;
there was no civilian or private analogue to issuing a marriage license, thus
in issuing the license she was compelled to speak only as a government
employee and enjoyed no First Amendment protections under Garcetti.55
The second doctrinal shift occurred in 2018 with Janus v. AFSCME,56
where the Court held that the First Amendment was violated where nonunion-member public employees were compelled by state law to pay agency
fees to the Union to cover collective bargaining and other activities

50

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006).

51

658 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2011).

52

Id. at 241–42.

53

123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015).

54

Id. at 930–31.

55

Id. at 942.

56

138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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benefitting non-members.57 Janus rests on that distinction between
restrictions on speech of employees-as-employees and compulsions of
speech of employees-as-employees, suggesting that employees enjoy greater
protections against speech compulsions than against enforced silence. Justice
Alito’s majority opinion quoted Barnette for the proposition that
“‘involuntary affirmation’ of objected-to beliefs would require ‘even more
immediate and urgent grounds’ than a law demanding silence.”58 Justice
Kagan’s dissent emphasized this anomaly—government can stop employees
from speaking but cannot compel them to speak, even in furtherance of the
same employment-related goals of workplace peace and order.59
I do not provide an answer to this hypothetical or to the NFL problem
(state action aside); the solution turns on four issues related to Barnette and
its connection to these later employee-speech cases.
First is how courts reconcile Janus and Garcetti—whether government
can compel job-related speech as easily as it can restrict it or whether
employees enjoy greater protection against compulsions, even as part of their
official job functions.
Second is how to understand what the objecting players or employees
are doing by kneeling or sitting during the anthem or pledge. Are they opting
out of the government message, avoiding a speech compulsion? Or are they
engaging in affirmative expression of their own? To the extent there is a
distinction, it could determine whether a case falls on the Garcetti or Janus
side of the employee-speech line. Perhaps it does not matter. The First
Amendment protects “symbolic counter speech,” in which a protester uses a
symbol or ritual to protest that ritual, collapsing the line between expressing
one’s own message and opting-out of the government’s message.60 Different
protesters have presented different messages by opting out. Kaepernick
framed his kneeling as protesting police violence against the AfricanAmerican community, while a group of University of Mississippi basketball
players in 2019 kneeled in response to an ongoing pro-Confederacy rally on
campus, framing it as a protest against racism and hate groups.61
Third is how much deference a court gives to the NFL or the government
in defining the job and what constitutes part of the job. The head of my
hypothetical government office believes the pledge is essential to reminding
employees of their public and constitutional obligations. The NFL has
57

Id. at 2459–60.

58

Id. at 2464 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633).

59

Id. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

60

Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 390–91

(2004).
61 Nathanael Gabler, Ole Miss Players Kneel in Response to Pro-Confederate Rally, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/sports/ole-miss-anthem-protest-kneel.html.
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(infamously) made patriotism and support for the military a staple of the
league and its games and would argue that player participation is essential to
that message.62
Fourth is whether, under Garcetti, there is a private or citizen analogue
to the pledge and to patriotic songs and rituals. Is patriotic ritual something
that government could try to impose on private people as on government
employees? That is, is compelling a patriotic ritual akin to testifying and
giving false evidence, something government could attempt to impose on a
citizen, such that the objecting employee acts as a citizen? Or is it akin to
issuing marriage licenses, such that she acts only as a public employee when
compelled to participate in the ritual?
III. COMPELLED EXPRESSION IN 2018
The timing of this symposium was fortuitous because of the rebirth of
compelled expression as a subject of First Amendment debate. The diamondanniversary year saw the Court tackle three cases in which Barnette and
compelled expression formed the core of the argument, if not the resolution.
The first was Janus.
The second was National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra.63 Plaintiffs were crisis pregnancy centers, clinics operated by antichoice organizations that provide counseling and medical services for
pregnant women, but without mentioning or providing the option of abortion.
California imposed two sets of regulations—licensed clinics were required to
post information about free and low-cost abortion services available from the
State, while unlicensed clinics were required to post information in
advertisements and other places that they were not licensed to provide
medical services.64
A 5-4 Court declared California’s regulations invalid. The Court applied
strict scrutiny, declining to apply a lower level of scrutiny because the
regulated speakers were medical professionals.65 The Court emphasized the
under-inclusiveness of the regulations and that California had other means to
disseminate information about available services without compelling the
centers to utter the government’s objectionable message.66

62 Melanie Schmitz, How the NFL Sold Patriotism to the U.S. Military for Millions,
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/nfl-dod-national-anthem-6f682cebc7cd/.
63

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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Id. at 2368–70.

65

Id. at 2372.

66

Id. at 2375–76.
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The third, and highest-profile, was Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission,67 involving application of a state publicaccommodations law (prohibiting discrimination because of sexual
orientation) to a baker who refused to make a custom cake for a same-sex
wedding.68 This case was the centerpiece for all papers on the Modern
Context panel.69
The case was briefed, argued, and commented on in free-speech terms.
Parties, amici, and commenters debated whether a cake is expressive;
whether a baker is different than other wedding vendors, such as
photographers; whether it matters whether the cake is bespoke or contains a
written message; and who sends the message. But the Court resolved the case
on narrower, religious grounds—seizing on stray comments by one
Commission member, the Court found that the decision sanctioning bakery
owner Jack Phillips was tainted by religious animus.70 But the dispute over
Phillips’ practices and these broader issues is not over. Several months after
the Supreme Court’s decision, a new customer filed a new complaint with
the Commission when Phillips refused to bake a cake celebrating the
anniversary of the customer’s male-to-female transition.71 Phillips filed a §
1983 action in federal court, seeking damages and an injunction halting the
new Commission proceeding.72
The Court thus resolved three compelled-expression (or compelledexpression-adjacent) cases, resolving all in favor of the party asserting the
First Amendment right. We may wonder why there has not been more
celebration of Barnette and the First Amendment.
First, Barnette emphasized that the case involved no collision of rights.
The Jehovah’s Witness students’ right to opt-out did not collide with the
rights of others to engage with the flag; the only collision was between
government authority and individual right. But the 2018 cases did involve
such collisions—with the rights of customers denied service at the cake shop,
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138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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Id. at 1723–24.
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See generally Kendrick, supra note 14; Goldberg, supra note 14; Greene, supra note 14.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1736–37.
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Nic Garcia & Kirk Mitchell, Masterpiece Cakeshop Owner Sues Hickenlooper, Claiming
Religious Persecution Despite Supreme Court Ruling, DENVER POST (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/08/15/masterpiece-cakeshop-hickenlooper-lawsuit/; Amy B. Wang,
Baker Claims Religious Persecution Again–This Time After Denying Cake for Transgender Woman,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2018/08/15/baker-claims-religious-persecution-again-this-time-after-denying-cake-fortransgender-woman/.
72 Verified Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074, 2018 WL
3870105 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018).
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with the rights of women denied full and honest information about
reproductive health.
Second, Barnette may be a victim of what Jack Balkin labels the
“ideological drift” of the First Amendment,73 in which the political right has
discovered the freedom of speech as a source of liberty, while the political
left has made the freedom of speech secondary to other values, such as
equality and women’s rights. Modern commentators have converted Balkin’s
idea into the critique of “weaponizing the First Amendment,” in which
claimants wield free speech to stop or undermine economic and regulatory
policy.74 Justice Kagan dropped the term in her Janus dissent.75
Erica Goldberg argues in this volume that Barnette “codes as a leftleaning case”—the Court protected a marginalized and oppressed minority
group and resisted right-wing pushes to enforce patriotic orthodoxy in time
of war. And Barnette as precedent has been used to liberal ends such as
protecting flag burning76 and allowing Jehovah’s Witnesses to cover license
plates.77 But Janus and Becerra (and the free speech arguments in
Masterpiece) wielded Barnette to different ideological ends, with the
prevailing speakers seeking to avoid the compulsion to espouse left-leaning
views.
Goldberg describes recent cases as examples of “good orthodoxy,” in
which government does not command people to respect its authority, but
seeks to protect historically marginalized groups:
Governments trying to remedy the effects of systemic
bigotry, which contributes to accumulated disadvantages
and socio-cultural biases, do so both by changing their own
treatment of these groups and by prohibiting private
individuals from engaging in certain types of discrimination.
These measures are then applied in ways that some now
argue stifle their rights and interfere with the important right
to express dissenting and counter-cultural opinions.78
The competing sides of the Becerra Court debated that line between
good and bad orthodoxy. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion joined

73 J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383 (1990).
74 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More
Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 180 (2018).
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Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
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by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch.79 Kennedy
recognized that California saw its regulations as “forward thinking,” as a
creative way to protect public health and welfare and to provide truthful
information to women seeking medical services. But regardless of the
government’s goal, it is never forward-thinking to force individuals to
become “instruments” of the government’s message, because
“[g]overnments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message
contrary to their deepest convictions.”80
In dissent in Becerra, Justice Breyer struck a theme that compelled
sauce for the goose should be compelled sauce for the gander. The Court in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey had declared
valid a state law requiring doctors to provide patients with information about
adoption and abortion alternatives prior to terminating a pregnancy.81 Several
states mandate that doctors read scripts to patients that are ideologically
tinged and medically dubious.82 Breyer argued that if the laws of some states
can lawfully require doctors to tell women about adoption, the laws of other
states can require medical counselors to tell women about abortion services.83
IV. CONCLUSION
Seventy-five years later, Barnette has returned to the center of political,
public, and constitutional debates. It is not clear where issues will land or
who will be celebrating. But one of the Court’s great First Amendment
decisions will be at the heart of the debate.
I hope you find the following exploration of that decision edifying and
provocative.

79 Becerra featured an odd divide. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, joined by the Chief,
Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. The latter four, but not Thomas, joined Kennedy’s concurring opinion. It is
not clear why Kennedy’s concerns could not be included in Thomas’ majority or why Thomas retained
the majority despite the other four signing onto a unique idea.
80 Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2365, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
81

505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1247 (2016); Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
83 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Transcript of Oral Argument
at 11–12, Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140).

